

# Film-Philosophy

International Salon-Journal (ISSN 1466-4615)

Vol. 9 No. 8, February 2005

Fabienne-Sophie Chauderlot

Filming as the Art of Thinking:  
On Wurzer's *\_Filming and Judgment\_* [1]

Wilhelm S. Wurzer  
*\_Filming and Judgment: Between Heidegger and Adorno\_*  
New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1990  
ISBN 0-391-03741-2  
149 pp.

'At least, when we create concepts, we are doing something.' Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari [2]

What constitutes the singularity of a philosophy and determines its power may be conceived through the abstract propositions which it is capable of formulating and ordering, as well as in terms of the ruptures it effectuates within the determinations and systematizations of anterior thinking. Defined as an analysis of ideas, the history of philosophy and contemporary theory have been set the task to unveil and expose the particular theses and propositions which distinguish one system of thought from another. Moreover, critical endeavors can also, though at rarer occasions, attempt to comprehend the ruptures introduced by certain thinkers in the very modalities and practices of philosophy. They thereby reveal an underlying agenda of reform and contestation which, without having radically modified the core consistency of thinking, nevertheless fissures its configuration.

As it brings near useful thinkers such as Kant, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Adorno, Wilhelm Wurzer's *\_Filming and Judgment\_* leads us through the region it creates to investigate some of these ruptures. Not the least important one is postmodern thought going beyond 'philosophy's protracted contempt for the priority of images over *\*Begriff\** ('concept')' (26). But as a highly original, complex, compound, and often brilliant array of thought productions, this book also offers the very illustration of the recurring concept it rhizomatically elaborates. If 'filming shows a signifier that has lost its signified and has thereby been transformed into an imaginal 'being'' (26), the interval opened between Heidegger and Adorno reveals multiple beings that may not refer to particular cinematic examples, specific films, technical camera movements, framed images, or isolated sound effects. However, they aggregate to form the very 'machinic assemblage' that Gilles Deleuze conceived to 'attempt the classification of images and signs' that make up a cinema he defines as part art and part thought. [3] Therefore, I propose not to read, but see *\_Filming and Judgment\_* as *\*imaging\** certain of the concepts that characterize a Deleuzian approach to film and to theory in general -- that is, 'gathering images not wedded to a representational experience' (38). Considered as such a collective

assemblage, this series of enunciations, references, echoes, and reflections provide a theory of the potentially cinematic dimensions of postmodern philosophy.

In response to the harsh criticism of *\_Anti-Oedipus\_*, the bestseller he had written with Felix Guattari, Deleuze defined two ways of reading a book. The first, 'perverse', transforms the book into the container of a meaning to be extracted or used. The other one, 'intensive', disregards signification to focus on connection: what matters is how the book 'works for you', namely how it plugs into the disparate elements that traverse your own life and partakes in the assembling of an individual subjectivity that encompasses brain, mind, and body. [4] Wurzer's *\_Filming and Judgment\_* presents a unique opportunity to practice such intensive reading; it will resist, from its title on, any attempt to be treated as a box whose content is solidly gelled and waiting to be appropriated. One might imagine that this 1990 book was yet another contribution to the then emerging and now established critical theory about cinema. Indeed, the vague and reductive one-sentence summary found on the back cover: 'The book represents an original attempt at drawing together post-modernist theory and film', does inscribe this subtly articulated collection of independent but interrelated essays within readily identifiable brackets. No such entrapment is permissible: films are here shown to expand over a diverse intellectual and artistic landscape.

Just as it is impossible to limit it to the field of postmodernist theory -- even though it undeniably also belongs to it -- this text should not be assigned to any one instance of aesthetic endeavor: if it eventually offers an insightful analysis of films by Bunuel, Fassbinder, Herzog, and Hitchcock, it also pauses at length in front of Velazquez, and relies on poetry (both as a source and a style). In fact, the issue is not film but filming, a concept whose gerund is crucial as it keeps morphing between the numerous variants that articulate the non-teleological elaboration of its open definition. Filming that 'may appropriately characterize the diffuse movements of the self within the artistic postmodern epoch of imagination . . . does not primarily belong to the technico-functional structures of cinematography' (26). However, in filming, '\*Dasein\*' may be viewed as enabling viewer, director, producer, writer, actor, and critic to see, make, write, and reflect upon a montage of images' (26). Filming therefore connects with the making of films, or at the very least with their appearance, since 'filming is the postmodern extension of a \*phainestai\*' (30). The Greek concept is to be understood in its phenomenological acceptation to simply mean 'what shows itself in itself'. [5] Yet, intending to break away from the ontological debate in which Heidegger still took part, Wurzer defines it as a 'propaedeutic shining which comes to presence in the event of image' (30). But this image would be more mental than visual as 'filming does not belong in the archives of cinema and detailed studies of filmmaking', rather it is exposed as 'a non-photologocentric mode of judgment, which accounts for a postmodern interplay of '\*Denken\*' and '\*Einbildungskraft\*' (thinking and imagination) (31).

In other words, filming is about a new mode of thinking, an imagination rupturing from transcendence, and it inspires a language animated by forces, intensities, variations of speeds, and plays on light: this book is both bright and obscure, alternately or simultaneously. Hence, *\_Filming and Judgment\_* does not offer a film theory \*per se\*, but a rethinking of theorizing cinema as an art of becoming-concept, namely postmodern thought. Eventually it perhaps revitalizes Foucault's question introducing *\_The Use of Pleasure\_* -- 'But, then, what is philosophy today?' -- and certainly embodies Deleuze and Guattari's same interrogation: philosophy today would be filming, no longer thinking the matter, but 'the matter of thinking', a collection of translucent images framed by, yet exceeding, Heidegger and Adorno to 'attend to a disruptive opening of judgment' (106).

Cinema here serves as one of the concepts Deleuze crafted to achieve what Foucault had called, in the mid 1960s, the thought from outside. [6] Films come from elsewhere: they

'break into the world and grant a view of being that is above and beyond the viewer's images' (105). Like certain privileged still images (Velazquez's *Las Meninas*), but as something *\*aparael\** to a simple series of sequential images, they would unfold outside the tenets of continental rationalist aesthetics such as mimesis, representation, and the duality essence-appearance. In *Filming and Judgment* the films themselves appear in the final section, the *exergue*, because they are the ultimate of the components that, gathered with Becoming (instead of Being), Sight (rather than Logos), Thought, Time, Bodies, and Space, partake in the forming of an assemblage able to transform both representation and our mode of seeing. While films materialize the space-time layers through which filming proceeds, filming is about exploring a judgment that would no longer 'postulate that there are pre-existing criteria (superior values), themselves pre-existing all epochs (originating in the infinite of time), so as to be incapable of apprehending the new in an *\*existing\**, or even to sense in advance that a new mode of existence might be created'. [7] It would be a process in which judgment, consciousness, and sensations are colluding to engage us in rethinking thinking.

Bergson, and his questioning of the possibility of producing something new, also comes to mind as one follows Wurzer in his exploration of a new topos in which to locate today's philosophy: the 'site' to which 'the cinematic avenues' of a 'radically different terrain' lead, the 'new site of judgment' which filming, precisely, unfolds ahead of us and always further away. Such surfaces are not smooth, nor is the intellectual ride on the discursive road of disjunction, displacement, and dissemination. Thought is to be understood generically and traced within the text itself in a Deleuzian way: it is a creative process, an aggregation of concepts whose irregular contours attract each other but do not assemble in a homogeneous puzzle. [8] Rupturing from the activity of applying reason to data resulting from experience, this process participates in, joins, or collides with other flows and in this sense, through our senses, becomes cinematic. The images of a film encounter sound, they deploy in time, result in the production of an internal effect, as well as generate affects that reach literally beyond the screen. The concept of filming operates in the same way: it unfurls in a dialogue with Kant's third Critique, and intermittently appears as painted, poetic, and filmic images whose links to their partially provided referents take the form of a selective glossary quoted from Heidegger and Adorno in their original language. In the end, the echoes of the German words come to be read automatically, like subtitles: however, instead of locating meaning into her world, their function is to deterritorialize the non-Saxon reader while reterritorializing thought as filming in an imaginary Germany where it would be possible to 'free the images of dialectic' (110).

All of these captions reverberate in a final list, as actors' names do in the credits, to form of a postmodern lexical collage with unexpected depth. In the 'vertiginous void' opened by Heidegger and Adorno, between 'being's withdrawal and identity's aesthetic diffusion', thinking attempts to free itself from ground (*\*Grund\** -- the principle of sufficient reason), detach itself from the bonds of dialectics, and wander nomadically, led by no telos, but in search of a disinterested philosophy. We take pleasure in Wurzer's involuntarily (?) building of film theory into an abstract machine that is not fueled by the processing of traditional questions about identity, subjectivity, narrative structure, interpretation, or even representation, but is propelled by a style echoing Derrida's that: '. . . it seems, . . . also uses its spur (*\*eperon\**) as a means of protection against the terrifying, blinding, mortal threat (of that) which *\*presents\** itself, which obstinately thrusts itself into view. And style thereby protects the presence, the content, the thing itself, meaning, truth.' [9]

Protection is needed as the ride on this machine is far from smooth. The excitement of exploring uncharted critical territories comes with the fear of letting go of our reassuring thinking landmarks. The characteristics listed to describe Deleuze's thoughts on Hume,

Spinoza, Nietzsche, Proust, or Foucault perfectly apply here to Wurzer's rethinking of Kant, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Adorno, Herzog, Fassbinder, or Foucault as well. What is interesting, according to Claire Parnet, is 'how thinking can shake its model . . .' with thoughts that:

'1. would not proceed from a good nature or good will, but result from violence exerted on thinking; 2. would not be practiced among mutually agreeing faculties, but would on the contrary push each faculty to the limit of its discordance with others; 3. would not conclude once recognition is achieved, but would open up to encounters, and always define themselves in terms of an outside; . . . 5. would be defined in terms of a learning process in motion not as a resulting knowledge, and would relinquish to no one, no power, the task to 'ask' questions or to 'present' problems.' [10]

It is in a similarly productive violence that meaning is here derived as a supplement to 'not only a vocabulary, but a syntax that may reach the sublime or a great beauty'. [11] This disconcerting multiple text both embraces and explodes the idea of the beautiful like a work of abstract art: it need not point to a definite object as it draws lines towards a renewed exposure of basic concepts, 'strings of ideas that are reconnected over a lacuna (rather than linked together by continuation)'. [12]

And indeed, *Filming and Judgment* is composed over a series of lacks or, rather, the kind of nihilation Sartre sees in certain psychic processes that result in presencing nothingness. The most obvious one is carefully elaborated in between the multiple references to *\*the End\**. Making us wonder if judgment here is the final one, the appearance of filming is imbricated in a process of fading and eventual disappearance that it does not attempt to fully compensate as it secretes the nothingness necessary to separate it from its metaphysical past. [13] Beholders without pictures, we witness the 'withdrawing . . . from the transcendental relation of reason and imagination' (102), after Heidegger has 'interrupted modernity' (30). The beginning of a 'geneafilmic mode of judging marks the end of philosophy' (34). Adorno's aesthetics allows Wurzer to conclude that Marxism has ended (58). Filming brings metaphysics to an end (93). 'Surflectants' (sur[face] [re]flect[ive] a[ge]nts) film the 'end of images' (97). *\*Homines sapientes\** lift their faces to the 'end of man' (111). And last, but not least, Hitchcock's *Madeleine* (not to be confused with Proust's) plays 'as the story of Athens ends' (115).

Just as it is endings that herald the work of art-thought that 'has yet to be' (115), most of the philosophical endeavors from which the new form is to detach itself did not completely succeed. 'Nietzsche's play of deconstructing and constructing the essence of ground occasions an indelible conflict.' (19) Heidegger 'opens up a terrain of thought that previously had not been possible in light of the precarious metaphysical identity of reason and ground', but *\*phainestai\** 'is ultimately still ontological' (29 and 30). Kant seeks to 'formulate a 'discontinuous' relation between reason and imagination', but 'ultimately, Kant's radical aesthetic turn toward a moral ground is a metaphysical boomerang which returns imagination to the principle of sufficient reason' (33). Adorno's aesthetics proposes a double theory of appearance, but his antifoundationalist strategies fail 'because he refuses to negate what he claims cannot be negated -- the gap between illusion and reality' (64). However the 'constellation' of these ends, retreats, and failures generates a collective dynamics that is fertile. The ruptures initiated in a conformist image of thinking, although doomed in their time, are here pushed to their limits on this side of meaning, to allow for a subversive reading of *The Birth of Tragedy*, *Thus Spoke Zarathoustra*, *Being and Time*, *The Critique of Judgment*, and the *Aesthetic Theory* as archives of postmodernism. Wurzer aligns ruptures, multiplies slippages, varies speeds to, in a surprising *\*turn\**, somehow recompose Kant over Deleuze.

An agreeable surprise therefore awaits the philosophically inclined minds: Wurzer, like

Deleuze, confronts cinema to look through new images for a new philosophy, one I contend explores Deleuzian \*percepts\* -- the forces that populate the world and affect us, make us become although we cannot feel them. Wurzer's rhizomatic style demands an affective apprehension of thought processes. But this may come as an unsettling revelation for film specialists who would have candidly embarked on this journey without the prerequisite tools. Paradoxically -- and the author's problematic proposal spirals around the articulation of a series of paradoxical statements -- this filming 'does not belong in the archives of cinema and detailed studies of filmmaking' (31); 'Art must not be regarded as a general order under which artworks are subsumed; similarly, works of art are not particulars which themselves or in unison constitute art' (50); 'Freed from metaphysical moorings . . . capital participates in a felling of capitalist closure' (91); 'Authority . . . is, therefore, free from authority' (96).

The very richness of Wurzer's approach to familiar but de-familiarized issues such as \*mimesis\*, truth, imagination, nature, taste, logos, spirit, capital . . . (not necessarily in that order and actually perhaps necessarily not in any order), his high intensity thinking, and the constitutive difficulty of his \*écriture\*, may however be the one flaw one could see here. There are very few images carried by the flow of words. In the end of its ends, *Filming and Judgment* will have unfolded thinking over a palimpsest more than a roll of film: it is quasi-inconceivable to detach the author's fragmented argument from its multiple textual layers. Although it offers an original way of understanding filming outside of a subjective pleasure principle, one may regret the reluctance of engaging with more images as objects of our gaze, even if Deleuze tells us that desire does not tend towards objects any more than it is internal to subjects. [14] In other words and in a sense, as much as this intensive book is plugged into other components of its assemblage in multiple dimensions, it still risks remaining grounded: to decode this reading of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Kant, and Adorno, one needs to underwrite, interweave, and superimpose, among others, Derrida, Baudrillard, Foucault, Lacan, Lyotard . . . one could add Lacoue-Labarthe, although he is not quoted, for his *L'Imitation des Modernes* so relevant to Wurzer's multi-faceted definition of \*mimesis\*. In keeping with the objective of Deleuze in *Cinema*, what is at stake is a theory of filmic thought, an investigation of the possibilities for an art form (cinema) to transform not only its processes but also the very space of thinking. What is at work is a praxis of minorization, and one ends up reading monadic as nomadic, until, as minoritarian, philosophy actively resumes its becomings. What is in mind is the whole corpus of philosophy from Plato's cave to *A Thousand Plateaux* -- but not really of cinema.

Wurzer's argument that film be deterritorialized from the realm of images is challenging but convincing. However, because we may not have become imperceptible yet ('becoming one with the flow of images that is life' [15]), one may still want to pose the question of such a scarcity of actual illustrations. Uncannily, the only time the text pauses long enough to close-in on a specific sight, it is to focus on a still image. *Las Meninas* is justifiably privileged because it is described, from Foucault on, to encapsulate a passing between paradigms, as well as to embody the movement, erosion, disappearance that may be both the core topic of *Filming and Judgment* and the defining characteristic of the filmic image. And indeed, the shift to painting recalls the elucidation of images as it is elaborated in *Cinema 1*, where they are in a flux that is only arrested by a perception still attempting to contain them as objects. None of them is ever fixed: 'Let us call the set of what appears \*Image\* . . . There is nothing moved which is distinct from the received movement. Everything, that is to say every image, is indistinguishable from its actions and reactions.' [16]

However, the fact that this painting inspires the most elaborate close analysis of the few visual components in this filmic machine is doubly revealing. First, it seems to point to the difficulty of sustaining the book's thesis by indirectly reaffirming (as I quoted earlier)

'philosophy's protracted contempt for the priority of images over \*Begriff\* ('concept')' (26). If *Las Meninas* 'invites a discourse' -- be it on 'dispersion,' representation's gap between the power of sameness and the 'free play' of difference' (45) -- one could conclude that it still needs to be mediated by Logos. If such is the case, should it become de facto representative of a cinematic thought, postulated to 'exceed the power of mimesis' (57), to somehow go beyond the fact that philosophical representation remains mostly linguistic? As long as thought is to be expressed by words, even when they are used to explore the possibility of non-linguistic thinking processes, can it really become this work of art -- detached from the 'logocentric instrumentality of power' (43) -- that the term filming intimates and the famous painting shows by portraying the absence of royal subjects?

Secondly, the investigation of Velazquez is very seductive, but it may take us onto an aporetic detour, especially since what the painting unfolds ('a representation of representation' (42)) is far from being exhausted and resists containment in the logical representations that are its various interpretations. It is possible to see, for instance, the nobleman as either entering or leaving the room -- Wurzer claiming that Foucault made a mistake, and the chance of his being right does not cancel the possibility of dual and contradictory visions. Regardless of which deciphering is correct (if any one should be), doubt therefore disrupts the order while it is being superimposed by discourse on an image it describes as rupturing a traditional order itself. Similarly, there are multiple ways of reading, or in this case, hearing images. From the fact that 'all lips are sealed', Wurzer infers that the characters 'appear to be speaking the same discourse' (45). However, the opposite conclusion can also be reached: the lips are sealed because the point is that no one can speak. Discourse, that always already accompanied it, is withdrawing with the classical order of power and representation. Hence there exists the possibility of seeing the dark nobleman figure to be exiting the room, taking along with him the remnants of a certain logic. Or, on the contrary, he could be entering the room as Foucault claims, to embody the mysterious character of the still unarticulated sounds of a voice yet to be heard. In fact, what *Las Meninas* invites us to is silence: the absence of the King's and Queen's bodies mark the fading of Logos and a passing between two orders of things: from the logical to a visual representation of a paradigmatic shift in power. Here the traditional subjects are mere \*images\* of themselves, the evidencing of a lack since their bodies are both off the frame and in a frame, merely extended in a narcissistic reflection whose human content is already elsewhere.

And that may also be why the hands are minimized in this painting, as Wurzer notices. In his study on Bacon and the relationship between eye and hand in art, Deleuze concluded that a 'pictorial fact [comes] from the hand'. [17] The hands are here effaced not only to embody the disappearance of the physicality of power and its release from the sole grasp of monarchy's control, but also because they are replaced by the gaze emanating from its multiple outcasts: the dwarf, the painter, and the mysterious male figure to whom the nun is speaking as he looks directly into our eyes. The beholder realizes that visual perception may be the real focus of the painting, because it is depicted in itself, without the presence of what materializes it (the hand that draws), and deprived of the support of an object for these eyes to rest on: what the characters' stare at either remains outside of our scopic realm or it is, in an inverted \*mise en abyme\*, our own reciprocal gaze.

The actual use of particular images therefore proves problematic for the postmodern form of judgment which filming displays in this text. Thus we remain unsure about the material connection between filming and film. Aware of this uncertainty, Wurzer keeps rewinding the filming practiced on such sites as he defines his concept: from its German etymology, filming is the 'cause of a fall' (82). It would be, if being could be, 'thinking as

imaging' (18); 'the diffuse movements of the self within the artistic postmodern imagination' (26); 'a postmodern extension of \*phainestai\*' (30); 'a \*glissement\* of essentialist thinking, [probing] into the fading of the dialectic' (98). Filming becomes all of this and more, but always and only partially so. The motion-picture we mentally form resembles one of dismantled and reassembled kaleidoscopic slivers, set in a movement provided by difference in the repetition of leitmotifs. From one section to another, they simulate the illusory continuous unfolding of filmic imagery.

Indeed, here are the keys to these essays \*a-cle\*: cuts and motion, mobile sections, incised movement. Emulating the cinematic process more than he actually speaks about it (as logocentrism is precisely what is disempowered in filming), Wurzer presents us with a series of possible snapshots of the images-motion Deleuze defines in *Cinema 1*. What appear, reappear, disappear are partial sights of issues which, though fundamental to postmodern aesthetics, are just as constitutionally incomplete because of their very infinity. The reader's task -- quite similar to a film editor's -- then becomes to locate these recurring images, collate them, and flip them rapidly enough to set them in the motion from which meaning derives.

Although the book is divided into three equal sections of three chapters, the text may not require a linear reading. It will actually demand repetitive flashbacks as themes start resounding like \*deja-lu\* -- see the treatment of subjects, for instance (24, 27, 49, 84, and 89). The only actually immovable essay is the last one, on *Vertigo*, because it is symptomatic of the reader's feeling after such an overexposure to intelligence -- in the etymological sense as well. What the deconstructionist text demands is an active and involved reconstruction of a finite number of topics surfacing over and over again without ever exhausting its problematic or our interest. Such is the case for the concepts of anti-art to which one is confronted (72, 74, 79, and 94); that of the polarity subject(ive)-object(ive) (24, 27, 37, 62, 71, and 100); the duality presence-absence (24, 27, 30, 38, 52, 61, and 88); and capital, imagination, first nature, and spirit (84, 87, 89, and 95); to give but a few examples of these refrains.

Certainly these are not manifestations of an eternal return of the same, but more one of difference in repetition -- perhaps the kind one finds in Robbe-Grillet's *Jealousy*. One regrets Wurzer's not having crossed borders to dedicate part of his poetic prose to a commentary on Robbe-Grillet's film/book *Glissements Progressifs du Plaisir* after reading his views on Bunuel's *That Obscure Object of Desire*. Such thematic recurrences, by mirroring and bouncing off of each other, re-present the very particular quality of meaning provided in film: one that is prepared in previous images, to be looked for in the following ones. If representing is making it present again, the compacted meaning expands itself here only between duplications, and is perceptible through resonances. Thinking becomes filming as it spreads over a characteristically Heideggerian space, temporarily populated with concepts that serve as useful things. Handy pawns, they are moved on various planes that open an ever fluctuating number of flexible mental regions. In *Filming and Judgment*, filming operates as an existential, the characteristic of being of postmodern philosophy. [18] Filming makes room, frees concepts at hand, to demonstrate that thinking is an art, and as such \*exceeds\* reason, be it in thinking or (and that may be the end of the paradox) in writing.

California Polytechnic State University  
San Luis Obispo, California, USA

## Notes

1. This text is an expansion and revision of a 1994 review of Wurzer's book: Fabienne-

Sophie Chauderlot, Review of Wilhelm S. Wurzer's *Filming and Judgment: Between Heidegger and Adorno*, *Man and World: An International Philosophical Review*, vol. 27, 1994. *Man and World* is now published as *Continental Philosophy Review*; see <<http://www.kluweronline.com/issn/1387-2842>>.

2. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* (Paris: Minuit, 1991), 12, my translation. *What is Philosophy?* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 7.

3. Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. xiii.

4. Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 8. 'There are, you see, two ways of reading a book: you either see it as a box with something inside and start looking for what it signifies, and then if you're even more perverse or depraved you set off after signifiers . . . Or there's the other way: you see the book as a little non-signifying machine, and the only question is 'Does it work, and how does it work?' . . . This second way of reading's intensive: something comes through or it doesn't . . . it relates a book directly to what's Outside.'

5. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, tr. J. Stambaugh (New York: SUNY Press, 1996), p. 25.

6. Michel Foucault, *La Pensee du dehors* (Paris: Fata Morgana, 1986), p. 16: 'This thought that maintains itself outside of any subjectivity as if to extract its limits from the outside, to enunciate its end, to make its dispersion shine and to only collect from it its invincible absence, and that at the same time maintains itself at the threshold of all positivity, not so much to comprehend its ground or its justification, but to recapture the space in which it unfolds, the void that is its locus, the distance in which it constitutes itself and where its immediate certainties retreat as soon as one glances at it, -- this thought, in relation to the interiority of our philosophical reflection and the positivity of our knowledge, constitutes what one could call in short 'the thought from the outside'. One of these days, we will be faced with the necessity of defining the forms and the fundamental categories of this 'thought from the outside'.'

7. Gilles Deleuze, *Critique et Clinique* 'Pour en finir avec le jugement' (Paris: Minuit, 1993), p. 168. My translation of : 'Mais n'est-ce pas plutot le jugement qui suppose des criteres preexistants (valeurs superieures), et preexistants de tout temps (a l'infini du temps), de telle maniere qu'il ne peut apprehender ce qu'il y a de nouveau dans un existant, ni meme pressentir la creation d'un mode d'existence?'

8. See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 1-12.

9. Jacques Derrida, *Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 39.

10. Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues* (Paris: Flammarion, 1996), p. 32. My translation of: 'comment la pensee peut secouer son modele . . . 1. Des pensees qui ne procederaient pas d'une bonne nature et d'une bonne volonte, mais qui viendraient d'une violence subie par la pensee; 2. qui ne s'exerceraient pas dans une concorde des facultes, mais qui porteraient au contraire chaque faculte a la limite de sa discordance avec les autres; 3. qui ne se fermentaient pas sur la recognition, mais s'ouvriraient a des rencontres, et se definiraient toujours en fonction d'un Dehors; . . . 5. qui se definiraient dans le mouvement d'apprendre et non dans le resultat de savoir, et qui ne laisseraient a



personne, a aucun pouvoir, le soin de 'poser' des questions ou de 'donner' des problemes.'

11. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* (Paris: Minuit, 1991), p. 8: 'non seulement un vocabulaire, mais une syntaxe atteignant au sublime ou a une grande beaute'.

12. Ibid., p. 152; see *What is Philosophy?* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 161.

13. See Jean-Paul Sartre, 'The Origin of negation', in *Being and Nothingness* (New York: First Washington Square Press, 1982), pp. 63-65.

14. Deleuze and Parnet *Dialogues* (London: Athlone, 1997), pp. 88-89.

15. Claire Colebrook, *Gilles Deleuze* (New York, Routledge: 2002), p. 128.

16. Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 58.

17. Gilles Deleuze, *Logique de la Sensation: Francis Bacon* (Paris: Eds. de la Difference, 1981) p. 103. 'Mais le fait lui-meme, ce fait pictural venu de la main, c'est la constitution du troisieme oeil, un oeil haptique, une vision haptique de l'oeil, cette nouvelle clarte. C'est comme si la dualite du tactile et de l'optique etait depassee visuellement, vers cette fonction haptique issue du diagramme.' 'But the fact itself, this pictorial fact that comes from the hand, it comes from the constitution of a third eye, a haptic eye, a haptic vision of the eye, this new clarity. It is a though we had gone beyond the tactile -- optical duality, to tend toward this haptic function that emanates from diagrams.' (My translation)

18. See Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, tr. J. Stambaugh (New York: SUNY Press, 1996), p. 42.

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